

Chapter 14

Disaster Management

In this chapter, the disaster management implemented by Banda Aceh City and Aceh Province is reported. The contents of the report are based on the interview with officials of Banda Aceh City and Media Center (Banda Aceh Local Headquarters). However, this report is tentative because of the very short period of the survey. Therefore the more detailed investigation shall be done in the future.

14.1 Banda Aceh City (Mar. 2, 2005)

- There had been no knowledge, no information, no education and no measures against tsunami before the tsunami disaster. So no manual and no measures against earthquakes and tsunamis had been prepared.
- As a system to alert residents, each village had such primitive alert system as a public official rang a bell.
- 3 districts of the 9 districts in Banda Aceh city were devastated due to the tsunami.
- It was very hard to arrange water and food to victims for several weeks after the earthquake.
- Since the Mayor was killed by the tsunami, the secretary acted as a commander.
- Searching for missing people and identifying them were very tough. It was being continued at the time of our investigation.
- Schools were examined whether they were able to be used as refuges or not. About a half of them lost their functions. Schools in Banda Aceh were reopened on January 26, 2005.
- The estimation of the amount of damage was conducted by the divisions of tax and infrastructure.
- Order of priority of reconstruction of damaged infrastructures was discussed by the city, the province and the national government.

14.2 Banda Aceh Local Headquarters (Media Center) (Mar. 2, 2005)

- Under the president's direction, the headquarters was established on Dec. 29, 2004.
- The headquarters was composed of staffs of the city, the province, the police and the military.
- After the earthquake, issues on emergency response and recovery were divided up and assigned to each agency by the president (Figure 14.1).
- Inquiries to the meteorological agency of the Indonesian government were made everyday because there was no experience and no information about tsunamis, while the

local governments had taken little communication with the meteorological agency before the tsunami attack.

- After the earthquake, a pamphlet about tsunamis was distributed to residents.
- Establishing the information center office at each village and summing up the damage information through the office, the headquarters has reported them to Jakarta regularly. (Figure 14.2 shows the organizational tree of governors in Indonesia.)
- Because the telecommunication system did not work, walkie-talkies had been used for contacting persons.
- Figure 14.3 shows the time-shift of issues on emergency response and recovery. Several issues are common with those raised by the 1995 Kobe earthquake except that it took much time to search and identify victims.




Figure 14.1 Organization Chart of Organizer Coordinating of Disaster & Refugees Management




Figure 14.2 Organizational Tree of Governors in Indonesia




Figure 14.3 Time-shift of Issues on Response and Recovery

14.3 Alert System

The most important thing on emergency is how to notify alert to residents, end-users of the alert information. Therefore, in the occasion to set up an effective disaster alert system, it should be considered not only the information facilities among disaster-related organizations but also the notifying way to residents at the same time. On the other hand, the capacity building of residents as the receiver of alert information is also very important to raise effectiveness of the system.

Based on the observation, the authors propose a mosque-centered disaster reduction system. Because, mosques have several features as follows.

Mosques are;

- engineered structures relatively strong against earthquake and tsunami in the local communities,
- built in almost all the villages of Aceh Province,

- regionally close facilities to residents' livelihood,
- to be able to give refugees a shelter,
- and already equipped a loudspeaker facility.

Functions of the system at the period of pre-disaster are education and disaster drill, and at the period of post-disaster, are to alert residents, to give refugees a shelter and to assist activities for survivors.

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References

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